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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, 
Attorney General, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 16851 
(Consolidated with 
Nos. 16714 and 16560) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS RETIREMENT BOARD AND RETIREMENT FUND 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
These Respondents assert that the nature of this case, contrary 
to the statement of the Appellants on this question, is the right, power, 
authority, and exercise thereof, of the State Legislature to create a 
trust which is not subject to the same restrictions or controls which 
are inherent in the general operation of government, where the purpose 
is a State wide administration, funded from general tax levies (the 
General Fund) and for the benefit of all citizens of the State, as 
opposed to a function or purpose of government where a segment, but 
substantially less than all of the State's citizens are beneficiaries, 
and the funding is from the trust res - not the General Fund. The 
authority of the Attorney General, both constitutionally, statutorily 
and common law, as to the first, is not in issue, but as to the trust, 
has been made so by the filing of the complaint in this proceeding by 
Appellant. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Retirement Respondents take no issue with the statement 
as to disposition as made by Appellants as it relates to them, except 
to note that they asked for affirmative relief which was also granted; 
and otherwise adopts the same. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Retirement Respondents (Board and Fund) respectfully request 
this Court to sustain the judgment of the lower Court in all particulars 
as it relates to them. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by Appell ant as a condition imposed 
by a sub-committee of the Utah Legislature and urged by the Legislative 
Analyst's Office in approving the Attorney General's budget in 1979. 
Appellant had previously issued a formal opinion (78-007} (R-284-289), 
holding that the Retirement Fund was not a "State fund" but a public 
trust fund, and that as such, the fiduciary responsibilities of the 
Retirement Board 11 ••• would be in conflict with control exercised by 
the ·state auditor .QI'. other .E_ublic official" (emphasis added). Subse-
quently, inquiry was made by the Appellant, the Attorney General, as to 
the propriety of that office subsidizing these Respondents by providing 
unreimbursed legal services from the General Fund. As a result thereof, 
a contract dated November 22, 1978 was negotiated by Appellant with the 
Retirement Board and executed by those parties and by the Board of 
Examiners for the State of Utah. (R-39-41). 
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The facts relative to the filing of the suit and the actions 
of the lower court, as presented by Appellant, are essentially correct 
and not in dispute, except that other statutes than those cited and quoted 
by Appellant are involved, as will be demonstrated hereinafter, both as to 
the issue raised by Appellant and the affirmative relief sought by these 
Respondents. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE LEGISLATURE OF THIS STATE HAS AUTHORITY 
TO CREATE A PUBLIC TRUST SUBJECT TO TRUST 
LAW AS DISTINGUISHED FROM AN OPERATING ARM 
OF GOVERNMENT AND HAS DONE SO IN THE CASE 
OF THE RETIREMENT RESPONDENTS. 
It is respectfully submitted that the entire argument of 
Appellant, as it appears in his brief, is founded upon an erroneous 
assumption, i.e.,: that any creature of the legislature must of neces-
sity be co-extensive with the State and its citizens, subject to political 
control by each of the three independent branches of government, funded 
strictly from tax levies, and devoid of any and all authority to act or 
function independently as a public trust subject only to the terms of the 
trust and trust law. For purposes of this POINT we will assume the con-
stitutional points raised by Appellant are legally correct as applied to 
such legislative creatures. Indeed, we agree for purposes of this argu-
ment, that political entities funded from General Fund appropriations, 
charged with the duty of operating in the direct interest of all of the 
State's citizens and performing an historical function of government, is 
constitutionally, if not statutorily, subject to legal direction from the 
-3-
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Attorney General. Again, for the purpose of this POINT only, it may be 
conceded that.Hansen v. Legal Services Committees of the Utah Legislature, 
429 P.2d 979, though on its face limiting "State Officers" over whom the 
Attorney General has direct authority· to those named in Article XXIV, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, should not be so narrowly construed, 
and that others may be deemed to be "State Officers." Nothing in that 
case, in the Utah Constitution, in the statutes, or in any other case 
decided by this Honorable Court, to the knowledge of the Respondent, pro-
hibits the formation of a public trust whose principals are "trustees," 
whose beneficiaries are a body substantially less than or different from 
the State's citizens at large, and whose authority and responsibility is 
to be found within genera 1 trust 1 aws as a "trust fund 11 and/or a "common 
trust fund," (49-9-10; 49-10-8; 49-11-10; 49-6a-6; 49-7a-5 and 8) (all 
statutory references herein are to U.C.A., 1953, as amended) and the 
statutes creating the trust. 
Each of 'the statutes referenced immediately hereinabove purports 
to create a "trust fund" or a "common trust fund" and designate the 
Retirement Board as "trustees. 11 It should be self evident that except 
as provided in the enabling legislation, these funds and this Board cannot 
be both "trust funds" and "State funds," and "trustees, 11 and politically 
controlled "State officers." These terms are mutually exclusive. The 
inherent conflict in the fiduciary mandate that the Retirement Board 
invest the funds " ... to insure the greatest return commensurate with 
sound financing adequately safeguarded" (49-9-11), and political control 
by any arm of government is so obvious that the enabling legislation has 
-4-
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exempted the trustees from the control of the board of examiners [49-9-12(2}]. 
It is difficult to conceive of a more clear cut recognition of the trust 
and trustee status of these Respondents in light of the legislative and 
legal interpretations of this Court mandating board of examiners authority 
where general fund monies were involved, (Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 
322 P2 381). To equate these entities with "State officers" and these 
funds as "State funds" in light of this exemption, is to ignore reality 
and operate in the fictional world of fantasy or the prejudicial world of 
pre-conceived notions. It simply cannot be realistically argued that this 
is just anothe~ po1itical arm of government. The statutory distinctions 
are numerous. 
If the employees of the Retirement Board were deemed to be State 
employees, a specific provision authorizing such employees to be eligible 
for coverage under the system would be redundant. We are unaware of any 
"agency" or general fund supported element of State government where it 
was deemed necessary to specifically provide that 11 Employees of (that office) 
itself shall be entitled to membership ... 11 [49-10-12(c)], in one of the 
State retirement systems. Indeed, the previous paragraphs of section 12, 
cited hereinabove, would mandate their coverage if the assumption of 
Appellant were correct. Read in the light of general rules of statutory 
construction, requiring meaning to be given to all of a statute where 
reasonably possible, and against redundancy (Peay v. Board of Education, 
377 P2 490, Metropolitan Water District v. Salt Lake City, 380 P2 721), 
it is abundantly clear that the legislature recognized that it was creat-
ing a trust and not a standard political agency of government. 
-5-
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Further, the Retirement Board is not the administrator of a 
single system, but rather four separate systems with their own statutory 
base, distinct qualification standards, contribution rates, withdrawal 
rights on termination and pension benefits. (49-10; 49-7a; 49-6a; 49-11) 
Each of these acts mandate that the fund be used solely to provide death, 
disability, and/or pension benefits for its beneficiaries. Consistent 
therewith, the legislature has required that each fund pay its own costs 
of administering the act, specifically mandating that legal fees 11 • 
shall be paid directly from the respective fund involved (49-9-5). How 
are the trustees to comply with this mandate if all such fees and expenses 
are to be provided by the general fund supported office of the Appellant, 
Attorney General? Since each fund is separate, its employer and employee 
contribution rate is different, as well as the benefits and other noted 
particulars, how can trustees invade, for example, the judicial trust 
fund to pay expenses ihcurred in litigating the issue of firemen's with-
drawal rights? _(Bryson, et al. v. Utah State Retirement Office, 573 P2 
1280) Clearly, the requirement for apportionment of general administra-
tive costs and the direct attribution of "special costs, 11 specifically 
noting "legal fees, 11 where taken together with the retirement legislation 
in general, establish that the legislature did, in fact, create an entity 
separate and distinct from general fund units. 
The provision of 49-9-5, with reference to funding of administra-
tive costs- aside from the specific area noted above, are enlightening in 
this regard. The final sentences of that section reads: 
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Since the administrative funds are 
derived from the systems and programs 
administered by the retirement office, 
rather than an administrative appropria-
tion from the general fund, any balance 
in the administrative fund at the end of 
a fiscal or biennial period shall remain 
in said fund, but shall be taken into 
consideration in preparing a subsequent 
budget recommendation. 
In light of the foregoing some very serious constitutional questions, 
much more far reaching than those referred to by Appellant, are raised 
if, notwithstanding the whole statutory scheme and in direct derogation 
thereof, general funds are expended to support the functions and interest 
of a group of the State's citizens, much less than the whole. Clearly 
the legislature intended the various retirement funds to be entirely 
self-supporting, and it is difficult to detect any constitutional pro-
blems so long as this intent is honored. 
Another clear distinction between these Respondents and general 
fund government entities is the authority specifically granted to the 
Board (49-9-4), to establish the compensation of the director. We have 
been unable to locate statutory authority for any of such entities so 
to do. On the contrary this authority appears to reside in the board 
of examiners and compensation of agency heads derives from the State pay 
schedule approved by that board and recommended by personnel and perhaps 
finance. Again, this is consistent with the trust and trustee relation-
ship of the fund and funds and the Retirement Board. Indeed, the 
authority generally to hi re ". actuaries, attorneys, medical examiners, 
investment counselors, accountants and such clerical and other assistants 
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as may be necessary • • 11 appears unique to the retirement office, 
and generally to recognize the trust and fiduciary relationship since 
such authority is inherent in the law of trusts and for all practical 
purposes nonexistent in general fund governmental agencies. The latter 
operates on established numbers or head count authorization, and are not 
directly related, in any way, to funds or budget availability. 
A cursory reading of the several retirement acts, including 
the office act (Chapter 9) clearly demonstrates that the legislature of 
this State did not intend to create or maintain a retirement system or 
systems patterned after the federal social security system which is not 
and has not been a trust fund, is not actuarially· funded, and which has 
served historically as a large pool of money into which politicians could 
can and do dip freely without trustee accountability to the contributors. 
If the Appellant is to prevail herein, the result will inevitably be a 
judicially imposed system closely akin to the social security operation. 
This is so because if the Appellant, as Attorney General, is entitled 
to insist on political representation of the retirement board, then 
his own opinion (op cit.) that the fund is not a 11 State fund, 11 but a 
11 trust 11 fund, must be reversed, and the legislature deemed to be at 
liberty to appropriate from the several funds or the combined fund 
for whatever general State purpose it deems desirable. In such case it 
is obvious that the Board cannot be held to the requirement of the law 
(49-9-3), that it maintain actuarial soundness of the funds. It is sig-
nificant that a legislative sub committee has considered doing just that 
-8-
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(R-282-283), but did not pursue the matter when informed of the trust 
nature of the funds and the prohibition against transfer or appropriation 
11 for any purpose other than that permitted by this act or the acts 
covering the individual participating funds" (49-9-10). 
Since the Attorney General has formally ruled (78-007, op cit.) 
that the Retirement fund is not a public or State fund, the Supreme Court 
ruling in Chez v. Industrial Commission, 62 P2 549, and Gronning v. Smart, 
567 P2 698, to the effect that the State Insurance Fund, as a trust fund, 
was not an arm of the State, are highly persuasive, if not controlling in 
this case. This apparent inconsistency is only reconciled when the factual 
background for this case, as heretofore noted, is recalled. 
Appellant has cited no law, constitutional, statutory or other-
wise, and made no argument relative to the authority or prerogative of 
the legislature to create a public trust and to designate trustees of 
that trust. While it appears that he has assumed a prohibition, no 
authority is cited for that assumption, and all of the law which we have 
studied is to the contrary. We thus conclude that Appellant has missed 
the real issue of the case and will deal in subsequent points with 
trustee powers and prerogatives as well as statutory and constitutional 
interpretation. 
-9-
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POINT II 
TRUSTEES, AS FIDUCIARIES, MAY NOT BE 
SUBJECTED TO POLITICAL OR OTHER DIRECTION 
IN THE HIRING OR DISCHARGE OF PERSONNEL 
OR THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR TRUST DUTIES 
GENERALLY. 
Control of trustees may not be exercised except in the trust 
document creating the trust - in this case, the statutes creating the 
systems, the funds, and the Board (Second Restatement of Trusts S 186). 
It is clear that those powers conferred on trustees by specific language, 
as clearly appears in the statutes heretofore cited, and such as are 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purpose of the trust, are, and 
must be held inviolate, where trustees are to be held responsible as 
fiduciaries for the management of a trust or trusts. To state the propo-
sition is to answer the question raised by the parties in this proceeding. 
Either the members of the Retirement Board are trustees, entitled to 
exercise all of the powers and duties specifically conferred by the trust 
document--the statutes--and those necessary and appropriate to the trust, 
or they are political creatures directly subject to the control and 
manipulation of political entities, and hence, not subject to fiduciary 
responsibilities and liabilities. They cannot, reasonably, be held to 
both since to do so would be to render them liable for actions mandated 
by political heads over which they had no independent control. Either 
the statutes creating "trust funds" and the Defendant, Retirement Board 
"trustees," are in full force and effect, or they are a sham. No poli-
tical entity may dictate to trustees who they may hire and at what rates 
they are to be compensated, if the trustees are to be held answerable for 
the management of the trust. 
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It is respectfully suggested that under the laws of this State 
respecting trusts, trustees and fiduciaries, the Court is without juris-
diction to interfere with the powers conferred upon the Retirement Board 
as sought by Appellant herein. It is clear from the Second Restatement 
of Trusts s 187, which follows the common law and is the general rule 
today, that powers conferred by the trust document are not subject to 
judicial control. That section states: 
Where discretion is conferred upon the 
trustee with respect to the exercise of a 
power, its exercise is not subject to con-
trol by the court, except to prevent an 
abuse by the trustee of his discretion. 
(e) If discretion is conferred upon the 
trustee in the exercise of a power, the 
court will not interfere unless the trustee 
in exercising or failing to exercise the 
power acts dishonestly, or with an improper 
even though not a dishonest motive, or fails 
to use his judgment, or acts beyond the 
bounds of reasonable judgment. The mere 
fact that if the discretion had been con-
ferred upon the court, the court would 
have exercised the power differently, is 
not sufficient reason for interfering with 
the exercise of the power by the trustee. 
The Appellant has not asserted that the Retirement Board, as trustees 
have abused their discretion. 
Case law supports the retirement position cited above. The 
case of In re Jacks Estate, 182 P.2d 605, held that where a trust instru-
ment conferred discretion on trustees, the exercise of that power by the 
trustees could not be interfered with by the courts, even if a court 
-11-
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would have exercised the trustee power differently in the absence of a 
showing that the trustees acted dishonestly or from an improper motive, 
or acted beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment. To the same effect 
is Geron v. Kennedy, 112 A.2d 181. 
It is respectfully submitted that even a legislative mandate 
to the retirement board in the trust document--the hiring of designated 
personnel, such as the Appellant--would be merely advisory, and not 
mandatory--if that board is one of trusteeship and not merely an "agency" 
of the state. (Restatement of Trusts, s 126(6)_1. It is stated that a 
lawyer designated as attorney to the trustees cannot compel the trustees 
to employ him nor hold the trustees liable for damages for failure to 
employ him. Thus, even a direction to employ a specific person 
(the Attorney General) as counsel to the retirement board would not be 
enforceable since it would interfere with the proper administration of 
the trust, if that board--as trustees--were required to accept the advice 
of counsel not selected by, nor acceptable to them since the relationship 
of trustees to a trust is highly fiduciary in character. 
It has been held that to enforce any direction to hire personnel 
upon trustees is against public policy. In re Lachmund's Estate, 170 
P.2d 748, when the court held that a provision directing appointment of 
a named attorney was merely advisory and against public policy. To the 
same effect is Amalgamated Transit Union v. The Dallas Public Transit 
Board, 430 s.W.2d 120, where, among several other matters, the Dallas 
City Council sought to enforce by ordinance the representation of the 
City Attorney in all legal matters involving the Transit Pension Fund. 
-12-
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The court held such ordinance to be illegal and against public policy. 
A series of cases and authorities are in agreement (First Amden National 
Bank and Trust Company v. Broadbent, 168 A.2d 43; Carton v. Borden, 85 
A.2d 257; 2 Scott, Trust - 2d ed. s 126.3). The authorities for the 
proposition here presented are too numerous to catalog further, but we 
submit that the law of trusts and trustees is clearly established in 
this State. 
None of the foregoing should be interpreted to mean that, as 
trustees, the Retirement Board is immune from accountability. On the 
contrary the level of accountability is much higher as to trustees and 
fiduciaries than that required of political department heads. Thus, 
those provisions of the act mandating submission of a fiscal year budget 
11 
••• to the governor and the legislature for their examination and 
approval," both as a condition or term of the trust, and as a general 
trust duty is unquestioned. As a matter of practice, interim reports 
on both fiscal and other matters are being made to legislative subcom-
mittees on an ongoing basis, and is not considered to be in any manner 
negation of trust prerogatives, but on the contrary, a clear duty of 
the board and the executive director as trustees. Only in trust manage-
ment, including hiring of personnel, establishment of compensation and 
general decisions deemed significant by the board and its executive 
director in the discharge of its fiduciary responsibility for the 
several trust funds is it asserted that no political or other outside 
control can be imposed so long as the trustees function within the 
-13-
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terms of the trust or trusts (the several acts), pursuant to the general 
law of trust, trustee-fiduciary responsibility, and within the bounds of 
sound discretion. Since the specific terms of the acts as heretofore 
noted grant this authority to these Respondents, it appears that no 
possible question can be reasonably raised thereupon unless some 
constitutional prohibition were found to be directly stated. As noted 
in POINT I, such a finding must, we respectfully urge, prohibit the 
establishment of a public trust in any form. No such prohibition exists 
in the Utah Constitution. 
POINT I II 
NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION--STATUTE--
OR RULE OF LAW EXISTS REQUIRING ATTORNEY 
GENERAL REPRESENTATION OF A PUBLIC TRUST. 
As cited by Appellant in his brief, Article VII, Section 18 of 
the Constitution of Utah renders the Attorney General legal advisor of 
State Officers. While in a general way it may be conceded that "State 
officers" may constitute a larger body than that specified in Article 
XXIV, Section 12, it can scarcely be interpreted as including all persons 
who are responsible for administration of a body which in any manner ef-
fectuates a public purpose. Specifically, it can scarcely be reasonably 
interpreted to include the officers of a fund which Appellant himself has 
ruled is not a "State fund" (78-007, op cit.). 
It is respectfully urged that this Court need not reach the 
question as to whether or not entities other than those specified in 
Article XXIV, section 12, are "State officers," and thus, re-examine 
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Hansen {op cit.) since the cases and authorities cited by Appellant and 
his argument, on their face would exclude these Respondents. On page 11 
of his brief, Appellant argues that the Attorney General 1 s responsibility 
II is ultimately to those who elect him ... 11 The class of bene-
ficiaries of the retirement trust funds is substantially different than 
11 those who elect him. 11 Acknowledging that this Court has determined that 
the Attorney General has common law powers in this State, the authority 
cited by Appellant on page 12 of his brief, as quoted by Appellant, 
acknowledges that this power may be--as in this case it clearly has 
been-- 11 restricted or modified by statute. 11 Again, on page 14, the New 
Jersey authority cited, restricts Attorney General representation of a 
State agency in the face of contrary legislation. 
On page 15 of Appellant's brief it is argued that the attorney 
general has power 11 • to proceed against public officers to require 
them to perform duties which they owe to the public in general 11 We 
agree--but, therein lies the very point in issue, acknowledged by 
Appellant, but apparently unperceived. These Respondents not only do 
not represent--nor may they--the interests of the 11 public in general 11 
but, on the contrary, represent a considerably smaller group, whose inter-
ests may, indeed be adverse to the public in general. The beneficiaries 
of the several retirement trust funds have unique differences as between 
themselves and their general interests are in n6 way identical to those 
of the public at large. Indeed, something over 80% of the beneficiaries 
of these trusts are not State employees, but, are employees of political 
-15-
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subdivisions whose interests can in no way be equated with those of the 
public at large. One system-~the Firemen--have DE_ State employees at 
al 1. 
Further, notwithstanding the assertion emphasized by Appellant 
in his brief on page 19, the question is not the same. Not a single case 
cited by Appellant deals with a public trust. Indeed, we believe this 
present matter to be clearly one of first impression in this jurisdiction. 
The attempt to lump these Respondents with the other cases which are 
distinguishable on their face proves the paucity of law on the real 
question at issue. 
To acquiese in the position urged by Appellant on page 44 and 
45 of its brief and hold that there Respondents may employ professionals, 
particularly including attorneys for 11 ••• in house administration or 
proprietary actions ... 11 is to do a useless thing. How does an attorney 
function except to do~ work which Appellant would prohibit? True, 
some attorneys accept positions which are not law related, but when they 
do so, it is not pursuant to an authority which authorizes employment of 
"attorneys." It is clear that the authorization of these Respondents to 
employ attorneys contemplate that they will do .legal work since their 
"leqal fees," as heretofore noted are to be apportioned to the fund for 
whose interest they were incurred. 
Further, the Texas liquor case cited by Appellant on page 44, 
favors the position of these Respondents since it defines a State officer 
as " ... one whose jurisdiction, duties, and functions are co-extensive 
with the State ... 11 As we have pointed out herein, and as we believe 
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is abundantly clea~ to this Court, the jurisdiction, duties and functions 
of these Respon,dents are in no way "co-extensive with the State. 11 The 
Retirement Board, as trµstees,~ serves the public interest since, as 
declared by the legislature itself, it is found that it effects 11 ••• 
economy and efficiency in the public service ... 11 However, an attempt 
to equate this. with the definition of State officer as provided by 
Appeliant is futile. 
We believe Appellant has far over stated the consequences of 
sustaining the judgment of .the lower court as it relates to these parties 
when he asserts Cit page 46 that. it would result in 11 • • • authority to 
designate legal counsel for any of the Executive Branch of Government ... 11 
Appellant adam~ntly refuses to acknowledge the unique character of these 
Respondents as trusts and trustees--hence not directly equatable with 
State officers generally. 
:951 
POINT IV 
CONTINUING AND CURRENT LEGISLATION AND 
EXECUTIVE ACTION RECOGNIZES THE TRUST AND 
TRUSTEE NATURE OF THE RETIREMENT FUNDS AND 
THE BOARD. 
In the recent legislative session the Utah Legislature passed 
two bills which are particularly significant in light of the existence 
:~.i \/ fi :: .·. 1 , ':' .'! ,.; :--1 r; ," 1', .,1 1 1'. , ' ' ,I .. :. I 1 • , ' , "j 
6f thl~ litig~tidn and its ~tatu~ at the time, of which they were made 
fihly aware: In an ongo'ing
1 
program: of requiring various entities to 
' " •.• '.:: .•• j l ' : " ! .; ' ; 
provide funding from individual general fund 'budgets, Senate Bill 54 
' ~ , : i. : , ~ ) '. 1 . ; 11 ', ' ' • ~> ~ '; 1 '., .·/ .' ' \ , I .I ~ ,' , . ' ~' : '' ' ' \ • 
was introduced which would have required the department of finance to 
"wi thhofd 11L fro~ i'he 1 iSba~·i b'udget11 s'u'ch' s~ms as were deemed n~cessary to 
''1~:'.h\ i ''" .. I·, 1 ''" ! ,\ 1 
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reimburse the State for general fund services. It was pointed out that 
the fund was a trust fund over which no custody or control was exercised 
by finance and the Bill was amended by its sponsor to simply provide 
that the Board would pay from its funds for all services acquired from 
general fund agencies. Thus, the legislature clearly recognized the 
distinctive nature of these Respondents and reaffirmed its intent. This 
is even more significant in light of the other bill passed by the 
legislature. 
In his formal opinion 78-007 (op cit.) Appellant noted that 
although under Oregon law the State Treasurer was named as custodian of 
the retirement fund, in Spraug v. Straub, 451 P2 49, the high court of 
that State specifically noted that this did not render the fund a State 
fund since another entity could have been named as custodian. It is 
therefore. somewhat significant that the statutes of this State, until 
the last legislative session provided: 11 the State treasurer shall serve 
without charge as custodian of the fund or funds. 11 (49-9-11) Consistent 
with legislative intent to make all expenses, including those specified 
particularly in the several retirement statutes, to which reference has 
been made herein, and all other operational and administration costs; and 
with the trust--trustee--fiduciary nature of the funds, that legislative 
session amended the law (House Bill 47) to give the Retirement Board full 
custodial responsibility for the fund or funds. 
In light of the designation of each fund as a trust fund, or a 
common trust fund, the designation of the Retirement Board as trustees, 
the exemption of the Board from board of examiner approval. the grant 
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of specific powers and authority considerably in excess of that given 
to general "State agencies" and "State officers"; (all as heretofore 
cited from the law) the exemption of the fund or funds from the Money 
Management Act (51-7-4), the fact that a substantial majority (80%) of 
the beneficiaries are not State employees, and the general purpose and 
objectives apparent in all five retirement acts, all of these demonstrate 
that the statutes cited by Appellant designating the retirement office 
as 11 ••• an independent State agency .•• "was no~ intended to make 
its officers "State officers" in the constitutional sense as urged by the 
Appellant in his representative capacity, nor to negate all of the speci-
fic grants, inherent in State officer status. When read in para materia 
all of these provisions, including particularly the constitutional ones, 
can be given meaning without declaring any of them void or unconstitutional. 
The historical background of the several retirement acts and the continu-
ing legislative action all serve to demonstrate that it was not the intent 
and is not the intent of the legislature to render the retirement fund or 
funds State funds, nor its officers, State officers. Since there is no 
constitutional provision prohibiting the legislature from creating trust 
funds, and designating the administrators thereof trustees, the constitu-
tional language relative to "State officers," is simply not applicable 
when the legislature so clearly acts to create a trust and trustees, and 
to exempt them from controls common to "State officers. 11 
In compliance with the legislative mandate and the clear intent 
that no general fund money is to be spent for the benefit of the several 
trusts administered by the Retirement Board, additional contracts have 
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been negotiated with the State Auditor, personnel and finance, copies of 
which are attached hereto as informational addenda. Considering the 
specific mandate of recent legislative action as noted in this POINT, any 
question of Retirement Board authority to pay for legal services by reason 
of prior legislation, if it be generally interpreted as prohibitive, is 
moot under established rule of legislative construction giving precedence 
to the later enactment where statutes may be interpreted as in conflict. 
The Retirement Board is required, under Senate Bill 54, to pay from its 
funds for "(a)ny general services provided ... from general fund 
operations ... 11 the contract at issue here between the Appellant and 
these Respondents, and those appearing in the addendum attached hereto 
all implement this legislative intent and, as heretofore noted, do not 
in any way violate constitutional requirements. All of these actions 
have been taken with full prior knowledge of the Governor and the other 
members of the board of examiners and with the Governor's specific 
approval and recommendation. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
In the interest of lawful, efficient administration of desig-
nated trust accounts; in compliance with constitutional requirements; 
in implementation of legislative intent demonstrated over a period of 
almost twenty years; pursuant to executive approval, particularly includ-
ing Appellant himself (by formal opinion and execution of a contract 
implementing it); and based on common sense - - these Respondents are 
entitled to all of the relief sought in their pleadings and granted by 
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the lower court. To hold otherwise is to render the various retirement 
funds wholely available for political appropriation and use and effect-
ually to 11 disinherit 11 the public employees who now have vested rights in 
actuarially sound funds, but then must look to the benevolence of 
government. Further, the funds contrjbuted both by the employers and 
the employees of units of government other than the State would be 
effectively confiscated by the State ... as well as those of State 
employees. It is respectfully urged that this Honorable Court sustain 
in full the judgment of the lower court, thus preserving the retirement 
funds as trust funds, the Board as trustees and fiduciaries with the 
accountability this entails, and the beneficiaries reasonably secure 
in their mandatory contributions. 
Dated this day of May 1980. 
---
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Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
(]/;kl t; ). . ·~r.:---. -;. 
ar A. Madsen . 
Ass stant Attorney General 
Coutisel for Respo~dents 
4~~ G. Blaine Davis 
Attorney at Law 
Countsel for Respondents 
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A G R E E M E N T 
,J 
This Agreement made and entered into this ~ ~ tjay of 
February, 1980, by and between the State of Utah, through Richard G. Jensen, 
Auditor, hereinafter referred to as "THE AUDITOR, 11 and Bert D. Hunsaker, 
for and in behalf of the Utah State Retirement Board, as its Executive 
Director, hereinafter referred to as "THE BOARD. 11 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS, the Board, through its Executive Director, has authority 
as a quasi State agency to hire auditors (49-9-5(9}, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended); and, 
WHEREAS, the Attorney General has heretofore determined that the 
Retirement Fund is not a State fund or public fund, but is a trust fund 
subject to administration by the Board for the exclusive benefit of the 
beneficiaries thereof; and, 
WHEREAS, by reason of the foregoing, it has been determined by the 
Attorney General and by the Board that the General Fund of the State of 
Utah should not be responsible for the auditing services deemed necessary 
and essential to the Board, but that the Retirement Fund should assume 
full responsibility for expenses of auditing service; and, 
WHEREAS, the Board is willing to contract for said auditing services 
with the Auditor within the limitations of law and the particular needs 
of the Board; and, 
WHEREAS, the parties are therefore desirous of specifying a mutually 
satisfactory arrangement to achieve the mutual objectives of the parties; 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed by and between the parties, 
in consideration of the premises and the several covenants and agreements 
hereinafter to be mutually and individually kept by the respective parties: 
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1. The Auditor shall, in an independent and professional manner and 
in accordance with genera~ly accepted auditing standards, examine the fin-
ancial statements and records of the Retirement Office for the period 
July l, 1978, to December 31, 1979, and shall issue a report to the 
Board on that examination. In addition, the Auditor shall furnish 
to the Board a comprehensive management letter setting forth comments and 
recommendations generated during the course of said examination. 
2. If, during the course of the audit, the Auditor shall find 
responsible indication of defalcation or other irregularities, he shall 
promptly inform the Executive Director of the Board or another responsible 
official of the Retirement Office of said indication of defalcation or 
other irregularities. 
3. The Retirement Office shall furnish the following to the auditors 
upon proper and timely notice: 
(a) All financial records, books of account, supporting docu-
ments, and other related records for and related to the period being 
audited. 
(b) As requested and as practical--copies of minutes of meetings 
of all administrative boards or conmittees, policy directives, agreements, 
contracts, leases, budgets, laws and other pertinent documents or data 
relating to the Retirement Office and such other information as may be 
required and deemed necessary to complete the audit as indicated in 
Section 1. 
(c) Adequate working space and other facilities for conducting 
the audit. 
4. It is understood and agreed that the fees for the services of 
the Auditor set forth in paragraph 1 above shall, therefore, be computed 
according to the following schedule of hourly rates: 
State Auditor and Chief Audit Manager 
Managers 
Seniors 
Staff 
Clerical 
$23.38 
l 6. 00 - 18. 00 
12.00 - 15.00 
8. 00 - 11. 00 
5.00 - 7.00 
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Reasonable expesnes including, but not limited to, travel, typing, 
postage, printing, etc., shall. be billed to the Board by the Auditor. 
5. It is recognized that while there are certain training aspects 
of this audit which are important to the Auditor, the needs, requirements, 
and economies of the audit require substantial continuity of staff. In 
order to establish and maintain such continuity, the Auditor will permit 
only minimum personnel changes, and the audit manager and senior shall be 
assigned for the full period of the audit insofar as possible. Other 
necessary changes will be discussed with the Executive Director of the 
Board in advance, recognizing that the Executive Director 1 s interest is 
solely the timely, efficient, effective and professional completion of 
the audit in the interest of the Board and for no other purpose. 
6. The Auditor shall exert every effort to perform the services 
indicated in this agreement for not more than $27,500. The Auditor 
further agrees to notify the Board, through its Executive Director, 
when the amount expended under this agreement has reached 75% of the 
total, if at that time or at any earlier time it is evident that the 
total cost will exceed $27,500. Such notification shall include a statement 
of reasons why the Auditor will be unable to complete the audit for the sum 
of $27 ,500, and a statement of the additional amount necessary to complete 
the services. It is understood that the amount payable pursuant to this 
paragraph of this agreement shall at that time be subject to revision 
pursuant to a mutually agreed upon amendment, but that in no event shall 
the amount payable exceed $27,500, in the absence of a written amendment 
to the contrary. 
7. Payment will be made to the Auditor by the Board upon receipt 
of the Auditor's itemized statement which shall include the actual hours 
1tmrked, broken down by categories as indicated in paragrap 4, and other 
reasonable and definable expenses. Such payments are to be paid by the 
l Sth of the month following performance and submittal of itemized 
statements. 
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8. It is expressly understood and agreed by both parties to this 
agreement, that in no event wi 11 the amounts be paid to the Auditor under 
this agreement exceed the rate and commission made a part of the agree-
ment or contract. 
9. In the event it is determined by the Board that additional 
audit is necessary or desirable for any reason, the Board retains author-
ity to contract for the same v1ith others as it is deemed in the Board's 
best interest. 
10. Recognizing the political nature of the office of the State 
Auditor, the parties understand that there is pending before the Federal 
Congress, a Public Employees Retirement Income Security Act (PERISA) 
which, if passed by the Federal Congress, may in some measure affect 
the validity of this contract. In the event of passage of such Act, and 
the determination by the Attorney General that the audit proposed here 
is for any reason not acceptable, the parties agree to a recision with-
out obligation for further services on the part of either party or the 
payment for services rendered after su~h determination. 
11. By reason of the nature of the retirement funds as an invest-
ment, it is recognized by the parties that confidentiality must be main-
tained. It is recognized that this audit is and shall be the property of 
the Goard, and that at no point, either during or after the completion of 
the audit, will information concerning that audit be provided to third 
parties, except as previously agreed upon by the Board and the Auditor. 
In this connection, it is understood that the individual auditors involved 
in the audit, pursuant to this agreement, shall refrain from discussion 
of any aspect of the audit, except a111ong themselves or when making a 
report to the Executive Director of the Board. The copies of the audit 
rr.port that the Auditor retains shall be marked "confidential 11 and main-
tained in such a manner as to exclude the information from coming to 
the attention of third persons not involved in the audit or otherwise 
approved by the Board or by law to possess the information contained 
therein. 
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12. This agreement constitutes the sole and complete understanding 
between the parties, and there exists no other written document or oral 
co111rnitments pertaining to the subject matter hereof, except as specifically 
provided herein. 
13. This agreement shall be binding upon the parties and their 
official successors. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their respec-
tive authorized signatures this :<o 7J!- day of February, 1980. 
STATE AUDITOR'S OFFICE; UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD: &._ 
Ri~hard G. Jen 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General 
~c;:,{_!(_.·J2-'"- /_~~ As~stant Attorney ~neral 
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SERVICE CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, entered into this ___ day of-------
1980, by and between the Utah State Retirement Board, hereinafter the 
BOARD, and the Utah State Office of Personnel Management, hereinafter, 
PERSONNEL. 
RECITALS 
It having been legislatively, legally and judicially determined 
that the BOARD, in its trustee and fiduciary capacity, is required to 
act solely in the interest of the beneficiaries of the respective trusts 
over which it has jurisdiction; and, 
The BOARD is required to pay from its funds all expenses incurred 
and services provided from State General Fund and General Fund agencies; 
and, 
Certain services are desired by the BOARD from PERSONNEL, and the 
latter is willing and able to provide the service hereinafter specified 
to the BOARD. 
AGREEMENT 
In consideration of the RECITALS and of the covenants hereinafter 
to be kept and honored by each of the parties, it is AGREED: 
l. PERSONNEL WILL screen and provide to the BOARD a list of quali-
fied job applicants (consistent with its general practice) for positions 
requested by the BOARD from time to time. It is contemplated that clerical 
and secretarial positions will generally be requested by the BOARD. 
2. The BOARD may request PERSONNEL to assist in locating and 
qualifying personnel for professional and investment positions. 
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3. Classification and training may be requested from time-to-time 
by the BOARD and PERSONNEL will provide such services as services are 
requested. 
4. The BOARD will compensate PERSONNEL as follows: 
a. For employees hired whose annual· salary will be from 
$6,000 to $10,000 - 4% of beginning salary; 
b. For employees hired whose annual salary will be from 
$10,000 to $20,000 - 7% of beginning salary; 
c. For employees hired whose annual salary will be from 
$20,000 to $30,000 - 9 1/2% of beginning salary; 
d. For those employees hired whose annual salary will be 
$30,000 and over - $3,000.00 only. 
e. For classification, $15 per person or position classified. 
f. For training, $3-$5 per person per hour. 
The parties intend that PERSONNEL shall be compensated in full for any 
service rendered to the BOARD and, in the event the foregoing schedule 
proves inadequa"te to this end, the BOARD will honor any itemized state-
ment even though it exceeds the foregoing estimated schedule. 
5. PERSONNEL agrees to initiate such procedures as are necessary to 
see that employees hired by the BOARD are fully processed into the payroll 
system. 
6. The above payment shall include all costs incurred by PERSONNEL 
in finding a qualified job applicant. 
7. It is understood that the services of PERSONNEL are not 
exclusive and the BOARD may acquire assistance of others or utilize its 
own or other resources to fill any position, clerical, professional, 
investment, or otherwise. In such event, the BOARD will compensate 
PERSONNEL for any expenditures made or expenses incurred until the time 
at which the latter is notified that the position has been filled. 
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OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
APPROVED AS TO.FORM: 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
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By------------
Assistant Attorney General 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE: 
Dale D. Williams 
Director 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
~~~_L «=-'>~ ... =--[ert D. Huns~ker, Executive Director 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief to William Gibbs, Bernard M. Tanner, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, William T. Evans, 25 South Wolcott, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112, Robert Moore, 10 Broadway Building, No. 400, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101, Merlin Lybbert, 701 Continental Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101, Frank V. Nelson, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84114, this Is!\_ day of May 1980. 
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